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1. WHAT PROBLEM IS THERE ABOUT PREMISES?
With the exception of some proofs of logical truths, all noncircular
arguments contain at least one basic premise, i.e., a premise that is not
itself supported by argument. In order to evaluate an argument, to
make an estimate of its worth, it is necessary to evaluate its basic pre-
mises. Given any basic premise, the acceptability question, i.e., the
question whether there is a presumption for this premise and how we
may ascertain its presumptive character, is of paramount importance
when the argument is to be evaluated according to standards of infor-
mal (rather than formal) logic. When, if ever, is a premise – indeed a
statement in general – acceptable? That is the central question of this
book’ (p. 3). This informal logic problem is even wider in scope than
Aristotle’s problem about the endoxa (reputable opinions). According
to Aristotle, the endoxa are to provide the basic premises for dialecti-
cal reasoning. Unless one can assess whether certain statements that
ﬁgure as basic premises are indeed endoxal, one can not properly eval-
uate the dialectical soundness of the reasoning. Now Aristotle charac-
terizes the endoxa as opinions shared by all or by the majority or by
the wise, and either all of the latter or the majority or the most promi-
nent and reputable of them (Topica I.1 100b21–23). The facts underly-
ing Aristotelian endoxality seem to cover the cases where basic
premises are vouched for by common knowledge or expert testimony
(cf. p. 296). (But even then one may wonder how to ascertain these
facts.) In this book, however, the author, James B. Freeman, deals
with many more sources vouching for basic premises, and thus with an
ampliﬁed concept of endoxality.
For this Aristotelian problem Freeman advances a Kantian solution.
By this I do not mean to say that Freeman’s solution separates the nou-
menal world from the empirical, but rather that it presents us with an
encompassing and thoroughgoing investigation of our epistemological
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constitution. However, what this quest is aiming at in Freeman’s case is
the uncovering of the sources of presumption rather than knowledge.
2. A SURVEY OF THE BOOK’S CONTENTS
The book consists of three parts. Part I is the most abstract part. In it
the author sets up various relations between dialectical and epistemo-
logical notions. Part II goes into the details of belief-generating mech-
anisms and their potential of vouching for basic premises, whereas
Part III gives practical advice about how to determine the acceptabil-
ity of a proposed premise in a given case as well as a philosophical
perspective on the whole enterprise.
2.1. Part I
In his ﬁrst chapter, Why do We Need a Theory of Acceptability?, Free-
man argues that the need for a book on premise acceptability arises
because existing answers to the central question (When is a premise
acceptable?’) are inadequate. He discusses Descartes’ and Locke’s
(classical) foundationalism and a number of popular’ criteria for
acceptability, such as truth, de facto acceptance (Hamblin), argumenta-
tive support, and probability.
In the second chapter, Acceptability and Presumption, Freeman (in
line with Cohen, 1992) takes the point of view that a statement is
acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor’ (p. 21). He
then proceeds to analyze the notion of presumption’ in order to expli-
cate that of acceptability’. He agrees with Pinto (1984) that presump-
tion is a dialectical notion referring to a context of dialectical
exchange between a proponent and a challenger. The kind of pre-
sumption needed to deﬁne acceptability is presumption from the point
of view of the challenger. Challenger presumption for a statement,
again, is deﬁned as a challenger’s obligation to concede the statement
at a particular point in a dialectical exchange.
In Chapter 3, Factors Determining Presumption, presumption is fur-
ther analyzed into two factors, presumption of warrant and fulﬁllment
of the pragmatic condition’, which are jointly suﬃcient for there to be
a presumption of statement’ (p. 65). Warrant (a notion developed by
Alvin Plantinga, 1993, and not to be confused with Stephen Toulmin’s
notion) again consists of four factors, three of which concern the lack
of contravening evidence (namely, the proper functioning of one’s
belief-generating mechanisms, their operating in a suitable environment,
and their operating according to a design plan aimed at arriving at the
truth), whereas the fourth concerns the reliability of these mechanisms,
i.e. the probability (which must be high) that these mechanisms yield
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correct results. Following Thomas Reid, Freeman holds that a pre-
sumption of reliability can in many cases be defended against the
skeptics.
The pragmatic condition is a cost-beneﬁt condition of which a
reﬁned version was formulated by D. S. Clarke, Jr.: X is justiﬁed in
accepting a proposition p relative to evidence e as true only if the
expected cost of acquiring additional relevant evidence e’ is higher
than the expected cost of acting on the basis of p which would be
incurred if p were to later prove mistaken’ (Clarke, 1989, p. 82; quoted
on p. 63).
Freeman stresses that there being a presumption does not entail
consciousness or awareness of presumption.’ (67). Even so, acceptabil-
ity’ is an internal notion (p. 71), which is , however, explicated in
terms of both internal and external notions. Therefore, Freeman char-
acterizes his position as an externalist internalism’ (p. 72).
Chapter 4, Epistemological Considerations, meets some internalist
objections to the present approach. It contains a discussion of episte-
mic duty and of BonJour’s coherentism (1985). Otherwise than in
(Freeman, 1996), Alston’s theory of justiﬁed belief (internalist external-
ism, 1985, 1988) now appears to be equivalent to Freeman’s theory of
acceptability (externalist internalism).
2.2. Part II
After the philosophical study of the concept of acceptability’ has been
taken care of in Part I, and terminological decisions have been taken,
the author now turns, in Part II, to a painstakingly detailed investiga-
tion of the various sources of presumption and their reliability. The
ﬁrst question to be asked here is that of the title of Chapter 5, What
Types of Statement Are There? After discussing classiﬁcations by Sproule
(1980) and some other authors, Freeman arrives at the following
epistemic typology:
1. Broadly Logically Determinate Statements.
2. Broadly Logically Indeterminate Statements.
2.1 Evaluative Statements.
2.2 Nonevaluative Statements.
2.2.1 Extensional Nonevaluative Statements (descriptions). These have
truth-conditions without reference to other possible worlds.
2.2.2 Intensional Nonevaluative Statements (interpretations). These have
truth-conditions that refer to other possible worlds, e.g. because
these conditions involve nomic generalizations of some sort.
The next four chapters inspect each type to see what personal (=not
received from others) mechanisms generate basic (=not inferred) beliefs
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expressible by statements of that type and whether presumptions are
created by these mechanisms.
Chapter 6, Necessary Statements and A Priori Intuition, distinguishes
ﬁve types of necessary statements: Formally True Statements, Semanti-
cally True Statements, Conceptually True Statements, Mathematical
Statements, and Metaphysical Statements. After inspecting each of these
ﬁve types of statements, Freeman concludes that we have seen that in
each case, when we come to believe them in a basic way through a per-
sonal source, that source is a priori intuition.’ (p. 121). A priori intuition
is not totally reliable, but it is presumptively reliable.
Turning to Chapter 7, Descriptions and Their Belief-Generating
Mechanisms, it appears that there are three personal mechanisms that
may be involved in generating basic descriptive beliefs: perception,
introspection, and memory. Perception can be either original or
acquired. Original perception generates beliefs about the physical
world, but also about other minds (via natural signs), in both cases it
is presumptively reliable. ... to deny a presumption of reliability for
original perception is to deny our common sense. It is to go against
our constitution.’ (p. 132). Acquired perception can be either physical
or institutional. There is presumption for these forms of perception as
well. For the institutional perception this holds as long as there is a
presumption that we have learned the constitutive rules governing the
institutional practice to which the perceived event belongs. Introspec-
tion as to the contents of one’s mind, as to mental operations, and as
to the causes of our bodily sensations; is in each case presumptively
reliable. With regard to memory, the conclusion is equally positive, as
long as the memory is clear-cut.
The voluminous Chapter 8, Interpretations and Their Modes of Intui-
tion, scrutinizes one by one the diﬀerent types of interpretative state-
ments and shows that in some cases even they may serve as acceptable
premises. Interpretations refer to explanations, of which three types are
distinguished: physical, personal, and institutional explanations. Each of
these makes use of a particular type of universally quantiﬁed subjunctive
conditionals: physical subjunctives, personal subjunctives, and institu-
tional subjunctives, respectively. The notion of an explanatory sub-
junctive conditional can be supported by a precise logical analysis, and
so can the notion of a nomically suﬃcient condition. This classiﬁcation
of types of explanation and of subjunctives suggests a long list of types
of interpretation, including such items as causal statements, disposi-
tional statements, ascriptions of belief and intention, attributions of
sign, interpretive classiﬁcations, and various rhetorical classes of inter-
pretation, such as the class of comparisons. For statements of each of
these types it is shown that they can be paraphrased in terms of the
explanatory subjunctive, or in terms of nomically suﬃcient conditions,
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or that they contain conjunctive or other truth-functional components
that can be so analyzed.
The mechanisms generating basic beliefs expressed by the three types
of explanatory subjunctive are called physical, personal (together:
empirical), and institutional intuition. Since the subjunctives correspond
exactly to the warrants of inferences (in Toulmin’s sense), the reliability
of intuition to grasp reliable warrants and the reliability of intuition as a
mechanism generating beliefs expressed in subjunctive conditionals
amounts to the same thing’ (p. 173). The warrant’s backing is the input
for the mechanism generating subjunctive beliefs’ (p. 173). This backing
differs widely from ﬁeld to ﬁeld and we must look at each ﬁeld sepa-
rately to assess the reliability of these intuitions. In the case of physical
intuition, Freeman perceives a great diﬀerence between intuition used to
impose the interpretive category of causation, which is not presump-
tively reliable (but needs to be tested), and intuition used to impose the
interpretive category of natural kind which is arguably presumptively
reliable as a basic belief-generating mechanism. In this Freeman follows
Kornblith (1993). Personal intuition is presumptively reliable where it
generates (on the basis of natural signs) beliefs concerning another per-
son’s proximate intention (goal and belief) or (on the basis of natural
signs of the corresponding occurrent states) concerning his aﬀective dis-
positions. Moreover personal intuition generates general beliefs based
on empathy. By a Reidian constitutional argument, we can see that per-
sonal intuition is presumptively reliable in this case as well. But it is not
reliable where psychological explanations are concerned. Institutional
intuition as a belief-generating mechanism is presumptively reliable to
the extent that there is a presumption one has learned the rules’ (p. 194).
The chapter ends with a section of objections and replies, in which
Freeman deploys Reidian arguments to combat Hume’s skepticism,
and deftly handles Goodman’s grue, Hempel’s ravens, and Quine on
natural kinds.
In Chapter 9, Evaluations and the Moral Faculties, Freeman adopts
a standard division of value judgments into judgments of intrinsic
value, of deontic value, and of aretaic value. Moral sense is a belief-
generating mechanism for singular prima facie value judgments, moral
intuition for general prima facie value judgments.
The section on judgments of intrinsic value contains a critical discus-
sion of the elitism of Ross (1930) and Moore (1903), who overlooked
the intrinsic value of human persons. There are three main sorts of
what is intrinsically good: satisfaction (including pleasure), excellence,
and human persons. Moral sense generates properly basic singular
beliefs of prima facie intrinsic goodness and badness of one’s own plea-
sure and pain, and moral intuition corresponding properly basic general
beliefs. As to pleasure and pain of others (as well as to features of
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excellence), Freeman argues that there is a conditional presumptive reli-
ability of the moral sense which generates conditionally presumptive
basic beliefs assigning prima facie intrinsic values to them. The condi-
tion is that our perception or personal intuition of the situation is reli-
able’ (p. 234). However, the presumptive reliability of moral intuition
when it generates general statements about the goodness or badness of
traits of states of aﬀairs is not conditional. … moral intuition is a
completely internal belief-generating mechanism’ (p. 240). Of course
all beliefs generated by these mechanisms are defeasible. Following
MacLagan (1960), Freeman argues for the intrinsic value of persons.
In the section on judgments of deontic value Freeman classiﬁes prima
facie duties according to their concomitant moral sentiments. The lat-
ter are listed (following James Wilson, 1993) as: sympathy, fairness,
personal integrity, and ﬁdelity. Prudential obligations, which are based
on self-interest and the desire for attachment are separated from moral
obligations, which are based upon the desire for aﬃliation. In this
area, the moral sense is again conditionally presumptively reliable, the
condition being that the mechanisms generating the interpretation on
which the belief is based are presumptively reliable’ (p. 250). There is
also a conditional presumption for the moral intuition in intuiting gen-
eral deontic principles.
In his treatment of judgments of aretaic value of feelings, desires,
commitments, actions, and characters, Freeman draws on Adam Smith
(1976 [1759]) and again on James Wilson (1993). Judgments of feelings
can be self-referential, other-referential, or impartial-spectator-referen-
tial. What we need here as a personiﬁcation of conscience is an agapic
spectator. Appropriateness of feelings equals congruence with what the
agapic spectator would feel in my situation. Similarly for moral good-
ness of desires, etc. Is the moral sense presumptively reliable in making
these judgments? If feelings, etc., of others are concerned, such judg-
ments presuppose beliefs about other minds, but the purely evaluative
part of the judgment is immediate and thus basic’ (p. 262). Once we
have formed the presupposed belief concerning the other’s feeling,
desire, or commitment, and as long as there is a presumption that our
understanding of the situation is reliable, we can see whether the feel-
ing, desire, or commitment accords or conﬂicts with that of the agapic
spectator, were he to be in this situation’ (p. 267). So there is indeed a
conditional presumptive reliability of the moral sense in this case.
Also, moral intuition is reliable in its aretaic employment. When judg-
ing my own aretaic value, the moral sense is presumptively reliable on
condition of there being a presumptive reliability of my understanding
of the situation.
In Chapter 10, Taking One’s Word, starting from Coady’s (1992)
account of testifying, Freeman deﬁnes an internalist notion of testimony
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from the challenger’s point of view: A statement that p as put forward
by a proponent in a dialectical exchange and received by the challenger
of that exchange, heard and understood by her, constitutes testimony
from the challenger’s point of view just in case she is aware of signs both
that the proponent is vouching for his statement that p and that the pro-
ponent has the requisite competence, authority, or credentials to state
truly that p’ (pp. 290, 291). Once it is understood that Thomas Reid’s
principle of credulity (humans have a disposition to rely on the word of
others) and his principle of veracity (humans have a natural propensity
to tell the truth) are both part of our constitution, it can be argued that
... the case for the presumption of reliability of testimony is analogous
to the case for perception’ (p. 292).
Several sources of testimony must be distinguished. Personal testi-
mony, i.e., reports of someone’s experiences through perception or
introspection, as well as his memories of such experiences, is presump-
tively reliable. In diﬀering degrees, the same holds for testimony
received through chains. Presupposing the presumptive reliability of
common knowledge, it is argued that – given certain other presump-
tions – there is a presumption for a belief based on expert testimony.
In the case of descriptive reports, there is indeed a presumption for
common knowledge and even for the word of the news media. Finally
there is a presumption for institutional testimony such as maps, signs,
timetables, measuring devices, and other scientiﬁc instruments.
2.3. Part III
Chapter 11, An Outline of the Practice of Epistemic Casuistry, aims to
address the practical question of determining when and why a particu-
lar basic premise is acceptable. For this one needs to answer three
questions:
1. What type of statement is it?
2. What source vouches for it?
3. Does this voucher create a presumption for the statement? i.e.:
3a. Is the source presumptively reliable
3b. Is the source epistemically compromised in this situation?
3c. Is the expected cost of mistakenly accepting the statement in this situ-
ation greater than the expected cost of procuring further evidence?
(p. 320).
The chapter runs again through all the different types of statements
and their belief-generating mechanisms to sort out in which circum-
stances there is a presumption for a statement. The orientation is
toward treating practical cases.
At the end of the book, in Chapter 12, Theoretical Consider-
ations, Freeman discloses the name of his position: commonsense
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foundationalism. Essentially, so we are informed, this is the episte-
mological position Plantinga calls Reidian foundationalism. It tells
us that should the basic premises of an argument express basic or
foundational beliefs that are either self-evident or that are properly
supported by nonpropositional evidence available to the challenger,
the person evaluating the argument, those premises should be prop-
erly basic or acceptable for that challenger.’ According to Freeman,
it has been the burden of this book to clarify this hypothesis and
present a conﬁrming argument for it. That argument is the justiﬁca-
tion for the commonsense foundationalist position we have devel-
oped over the course of this book’ (p. 369). This commonsense
approach, which turns out to be inspired not only by Thomas Reid,
but also by Charles Peirce’s critical common sensism, is defended
against Pyrrho and Hume.
The book ends with programmatic remarks about aesthetic valua-
tions and sensus divinitatis. However, these matters, as well as the
question of connection adequacy, exceed the bounds of this book.
3. COMMENTS
Let us return to the book’s ﬁrst sentence (already quoted in Section 1):
When, if ever, is a premise – indeed a statement in general – accept-
able?’ (p.3). This is a question of formidable scope, which would even
be larger had the author taken seriously what is put between dashes:
indeed a statement in general’; for then it would have been necessary
to account also for arguments as a source of acceptability and hence
for connection adequacy, a subject that the author, at the end of the
book, emphatically leaves out. The task that remains is large enough
and involves most of epistemology (although the focus is on presump-
tion rather than knowledge). The author is to be admired for putting
the project through in an orderly and well-organized way, with an eye
for many interesting questions that are met on the road, but never los-
ing track of the right course to fare.
The task would have been a lot easier had the author, right in the
beginning, agreed with Hamblin’s position that a statement is accept-
able if and only if it is accepted (p. 12). Hamblin’s position is close to
the pragma-dialectical view that exactly those statements about which
the discussants have agreed – in the opening stage – that they can be
used as basic premises may be so used. Adoption of this point of view
is not an abandonment of normativity, though it leaves aside the con-
sideration of acceptability of statements per se, that is, outside of a
context where discussants make such agreements. There are still norms
to consider. For one thing there is the norm that discussants should
108 BOOK REVIEW
abide by the agreements they made, and of course there are many
other procedural norms of argumentation. Thus it is possible to have
a normative theory of argumentation that is not concerned about the
epistemic norms for acceptance. This does not mean that the problem
of acceptability is not there, but only that it can be left to another
discipline. If one, for once, makes a distinction here between informal
logic and argumentation theory, one could say that informal logic
incorporates the part of epistemology needed to deal with the problem
of acceptability, whereas argumentation theory leaves this problem to
epistemology.
Pragma-dialecticians and other Hamblinians may see Freeman’s
book as a book on epistemology, rather than as one concerning their
core business, but that is not to say that for them the book is without
interest. As soon as it comes to the application of argumentation the-
ory – the evaluation or construction of particular arguments – it will
be crucially important to make correct estimates about whether or not
certain premises are generally accepted, and for this it can be very
helpful to have theoretical insight into the normative foundations of
acceptance; therefore, James Freeman’s book will be most welcome to
them as well.
The bulk of the book consists of piecemeal research into the pre-
sumptive reliability of numerous belief-generating mechanisms, under-
taken in Part II. Rightly so, because the heart of the problem of
acceptability lies in the speciﬁc problems connected with particular
types of statements. Therefore, it is a good thing that most space is
devoted to these detailed investigations, which are then followed by
directions for the practical assessment of premise acceptability in
Chapter 11 (Part III). Not that the more abstract chapters of Part I
could have been left out. They serve to settle a number of conceptual
and terminological issues that the author had to deal with anyway,
and thus contribute to the clarity of the whole. What may be a bit dis-
appointing for some is that the more concrete and practical sections
(Part II and Chapter 11) are still rather abstract. The author provides
examples and cases, but not many. Admittedly, adding more casework
would have made the book still more voluminous.
In Chapter 2, the dialectical deﬁnition of challenger presumption (as a
challenger’s obligation to concede a statement at a particular point in a
dialectical exchange) is problematic. For, now one may ask what is
meant by an obligation to concede’. Freeman adds some clariﬁcation
(p. 30) from which it appears that this obligation is a dialectical one. We
can think of it as determined by a normative system of dialectic. The
dialectical situation is such that asking for a justiﬁcation of a statement
S (which is a basic premise proposed by the proponent) would involve
the dialectical obligation to show that such a justiﬁcation is required.
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But the challenger is unable to show this (she has no plausible justiﬁca-
tion for her request nor plausible counterconsiderations against S,’
p. 30). There is a dialectical rule which stipulates that you must either
challenge or concede a proposed premise. The challenger can not chal-
lenge, so, by dint of dialectical rules, she is obliged to concede. This may
seem clear-cut, but how can the challenger be sure that she will not be
able to show the need for justiﬁcation of S? Is the obligation to concede
S dependent on what the challenger perceives as plausible? Then the def-
inition will be psychological rather than dialectical. Challenger presump-
tion would be a psychological rather than a dialectical concept. Or is the
unavailability of means to show the need of justiﬁcation of S again
determined by dialectical rules? Then the deﬁnition would not apply to
most interesting cases of presumption, since these are all defeasible, so
that showing the need for justiﬁcation can not be ruled out by sound
dialectical rules.
Perhaps this deﬁnition is putting the cart before the horse. Pre-
sumption should not be deﬁned in terms of obligation to concede, but
obligation to concede should be deﬁned in terms of presumption. Pre-
sumption then would be deﬁned for different types of statement sepa-
rately by the piecemeal approach of Part II. In fact, Part II does not
depend on the dialectical deﬁnition of Chapter 2. We may conclude
that in Freeman’s book presumption ﬁgures as an epistemic notion,
rather than a dialectical one.
Ultimately, Freeman’s deﬁnition of acceptability’ is circular: accept-
ability is deﬁned in terms of challenger’s presumption (p. 32), chal-
lenger’s presumption is, as we saw, deﬁned in terms of obligation to
concede (pp. 29–30), but on p. 45 (let us recall that to concede a
proposition is to grant that it is acceptable’) it seems that concession is
again deﬁned in terms of acceptability. However, this circularity need
not be vicious, when the purpose is to establish relations between
some concepts.
About Parts II and III I shall only make some stray remarks. I was
surprised to see that Freeman discusses necessary statements and a pri-
ori intuition without even mentioning Kripke’s distinction between the
necessary and the a priori. Perhaps there was no need to, but even
then the reader would have expected at least some remark about why
the Kripkean distinction could be left aside. There is also a neglect of
the indeterminacy of set theory: nowadays, there are many mathemati-
cal universes (e.g., with or without the Axiom of Choice or the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis), and it seems very implausible that we can intuit
the truth, let only the necessary truth, of the null axiom (p.121). The
necessity of mathematical statements may have to be relativized to a
particular mathematical universe. Many other examples Freeman gives
of necessary truths are controversial. Intuitionists do not accept the
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Law of Excluded Middle (p. 114, ﬁrst formally true statement), Free
logicians will object to the implication of the existential quantiﬁcation
by the universal (p. 114, second formally true statement), and together
with Meinong they will object to the principle that no object can have
a property without existing’ (p. 117).
According to Freeman, there is no need to argue that there is a pre-
sumption for the reliability of perception (p. 132). Yet Freeman (fol-
lowing the lead of Thomas Reid) argues at length that there is such a
presumption (pp. 127–138), and rightly so.
In Section 8.3 Freeman presents his own (and Charles Daniels’s,
1980) analysis of the subjunctive conditional. He does not explain why
he does not use the Stalnaker-Lewis type of analysis, or whether that
would make a difference. Admittedly, all Freeman needs to show here
is that some analysis is possible.
On page 185, I found the use of upper and lower case delta confus-
ing, but this may entirely be my fault.
I found the inductive proof on pp. 203–204 fascinating, but am still
in doubt about what it proves. Perhaps it shows that for each consis-
tent formula of propositional logic there is a substitution instance
(with subjunctives substituted for propositional letters) that one can
come to believe on the basis of perception and/or intuition (including
a priori intuition).
Freeman staunchly defends the intrinsic value of human persons,
which makes one wonder about the intrinsic value of nonhuman crea-
tures.
Figure 9.1 on p. 245 was really helpful. Unfortunately, there are
very few ﬁgures in the book.
On p. 311, it is argued that there is indeed a presumption for com-
mon knowledge or commonsense beliefs. One argument given for this
rests on the (Aristotelian) principle that in a good argument, the pre-
mises should have greater prior probability or plausibility than the
conclusion’ (p. 311). This would allegedly make it impossible to argue
against a commonsense proposition C without committing the fallacy
of problematic premise. I think this argument is ﬂawed. An argument
against C is an argument for the conclusion not-C. If C has the high-
est degree of certainty or plausibility, not-C has the lowest. The Aris-
totelian principle, therefore, does not stand in the way of ﬁnding
premises for this argument; premises of any degree of certainty or
plausibility higher than the lowest will do, as far as this principle is
concerned. In particular, there is no need for the premises to be more
certain or plausible than C in order to raise the plausibility of not-C,
and lower that of C, to such an extent that in the end the presumption
will be on the side of not-C. For instance, it used to be common
knowledge that the earth is ﬂat. Against this, arguments could be
BOOK REVIEW 111
brought starting from acceptable premises (though not perhaps of the
highest degree of plausibility), which eventually tipped the balance. Of
course by pointing out the failure of this argument for the presumptive
reliability of common knowledge I am not implying that common
knowledge fails to be presumptively reliable.
Chapter 11, on epistemic casuistry, could have done with more
examples and case-work. Parts of this chapter now consist of rather
lengthy abstract expositions (e.g. on pp. 352–353).
One may wonder why a proponent would ever advance as a pre-
mise some piece of common knowledge. Either the challenger will
share this common knowledge, which would make it unnecessary to
state it, or she will lack this piece of common knowledge, in which
case the proponent must defend it by argument instead of trying to
use it as a basic premise (cf. p. 355). But the answer is in the book;
turn back to p. 322: even if the challenger shares the knowledge it may
be useful to increase the salience.
James Freeman has given us a very substantial book. From my sur-
vey of its contents it might seem that it is very hard to read, but actu-
ally the book is well-written and well-organized. It may be used as a
handbook of commonsense foundationalism. It is an epistemological
work, but epistemology has been severed from the austere concepts of
knowledge and certainty and has been brought down to the more
mundane concern of establishing presumptions. There is a laudable
stress on the defeasibility of nearly everything. Some may complain
that the book too easily declares many of our belief-generating mecha-
nisms to be presumptively reliable, but others – this reader being
among them – will ﬁnd and accept well-argued easement for their
skeptical qualms. Of course many debatable points remain. No worry,
... the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself.’
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